In this paper, differences in the assessment of mission risks and mission benefits between operators and members of the management level in the transport helicopter branch of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) are studied. Results were obtained from a risk analysis that was conducted in accordance with RNLAF procedures. The analysis suggests that the two organizational levels have a coherent perception on risks despite their hierarchical position. Perceived measures of controlcontrollability -seem to induce the inclusion or the exclusion of what is appeared to be a risk. The analysis also suggests that risk management tools may obscure these perceptual differences. Risk management tools may therefore not be sufficient to attain safe operations. In discussions and future studies on risk management and on hierarchical differences in risk perception, this is something to take well notice of. Also, managers and others involved in risk management need to recognize the implications of using risk management instruments that are based on simplified models of risk. This research adds to the risk management theory because it connects multidimensional risk theory with actual organizational risk management practice.
Introduction
Risk society, risks and risk management have become important issues in the past decennia, especially in western societies, instigated mainly by Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990) . A risk society is defined by Giddens (1993, 3) as 'a society increasingly occupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk'. Within such a risk society, risk can be defined as 'a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself' (Beck 1992, 21) . Risk management, then, refers to the process of reducing these risks to a level deemed tolerable by society, and controlling, monitoring and communicating these risks in public (Morgan 1990) . Organizations, societies and international corporations are studying, canalising and determining all kinds of risks they themselves and their members could encounter. Military organizations, such as military aviation departments, form no exception here. Some aspects of the process of risk reduction have been explored in the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) and described in this paper.
Theoretical framework
It is common knowledge that the actions and perceptions of individuals at one (hierarchical) level of an organization can influence the actions and perceptions of individuals at another level of the organization (Griffin and Mathieu 1997) . This does not imply necessarily, however, that these perceptions are shared perceptions. Safety perceptions, for example, may differ between employees depending on their position and/or hierarchical level within the organization (Arboleda et al. 2003) . Also, not only Prussia, Brown, and Willis (2003) , in their study of mental models of safety in the steel plant industry, but also Mearns and Flin (1995) , in their study of perceptions and attitudes of safety in the offshore oil and gas industry, found that perceptions of managers differed from the perceptions of their workers where safety issues within the organization were concerned. This is plausible since research in the past has suggested that people select issues of concern (risks) as a result of cultural conventions and social constructions (Renn 1998) , and of institutional, procedural and societal processes (Slovic 2001) . Crucial issues in this process, and thus factors of significance in risk assessments, seem to be features such as (perceived) controllability, voluntariness, fear, fairness, etc. (Slovic 1999) . It is clear that these features could well differ between workers at distinct hierarchical levels. For instance, although it is the operators on the work floor who physically bear the operational risks, they normally have only limited control on what the management level deems acceptable. All this is consistent with the concept of 'local rationality'.
The concept of local rationality was first introduced by Woods et al. (1994) , and forms an adaptation of Simon's (1969) concept of 'bounded rationality'. Where classic decision-making theories allocate shortcomings in rationality mainly to limitations of cognitive capacities, Woods et al. (1994) emphasize with their concept of local rationality that any problem solving process -or risk assessment if you will -is context dependent, even when cognitive capacity would be infinite. According to Dekker (2002, 9) , people [do] what makes sense given the situational indications, operational pressures, and organizational norms. [They] do things that are reasonable -or rational -based on their limited knowledge, goals, and understanding of the situation, and their limited resources at the time.
In other words, what people do or not do -or how they assess safety -can be fully (although local) rational and still differ dependent, for example, on the position that people have been allocated. This also holds in the military.
Military aviation missions nowadays take place in modern theatres of war. Units regularly are deployed on expeditionary operations far away from home base. International support for these missions is ensured by forming multinational alliances, often referred to as 'combined' forces. Above all, in order to enlarge the effectiveness of operations, army, air force and navy units often work close together in so-called 'joint' units. These combined and joined operations abroad make that today's military theatres can be said to be highly complex. The complexity of such situations follows among others from the inherent incompleteness of information that is available to decision-makers at all levels. These decision-makers, at the same time, are ethically obliged to establish not only a safe environment for the community around them, but also for their own and friendly forces (Richardson, Verweij, and Winslow 2004) . After all, the inevitable risks inherent to accomplishing international security do not relieve military (aviation) upper level managers from their responsibility to create work safety up to the maximally attainable level. In environments such as described here, they can be expected not always to succeed in this, at least not in the eyes of the beholders of perceived residual risks, the operators in the field. The acceptance of these residual risks, at the same time, depends largely on the degree to which the risk bearers trust their decisionmakers (Freudenburg 1993) . Operators can be highly motivated to take risks and suffer the consequences. However, this motivation can change very quickly if risks cannot be justified or are not congruent with their own attitudes and values (Linnerooth-Bayer and Fitzgerald 1996) . For interpersonal trust to be achieved it is further important that risks fall within the operators' 'interpretative frames' 1 as Ekman (2009) called them in his presentation on interpersonal trust at an operational headquarter of a military mission in Tchad.
Considering the apparent value of top level risk assessments to be acceptable to military operators in the field, it would be interesting to explore the landscape of risk and risk assessment of the socalled 'sharp-end' military aviation front line operators on the one hand, and their decisionmakers at the upper management levels on the other. Another argument to explore this area has been argued for by Uhr and Ekman (2008) in a study of trust and its consequences in emergency response operations: there seems to be a link between distrust and 'not-having-the-same-opinion'. By exploring the differences between these two hierarchical levels regarding assessments of risks we think we can gain a more complete understanding on risk, risk perception and risk management in organizational settings -more specific: in military organizational settings.
Research question and expectations
In military aviation units, it is common practice for decision-makers at all levels to manage operational risks through the use of a risk management instrument called operational risk management (ORM). Although differences can be observed, the general principles of ORM remain the same, even internationally. In contrast to risk research that suggests that risk has many different dimensions (as we have described briefly above as well), in ORM procedures risk normally is determined along two dimensions only: frequency of appearance (risk frequency) and severity of the event (risk severity). The tool, thus based upon 'the traditional [simplified] view of risk as some objective function of probability (uncertainty) and adverse consequences' (Slovic 2001) is, however, part of the real world risk management practice and hence valuable to study. The main question to be answered in the study therefore was formulated as whether and to what extent operators and upper level managers perceive frequency and severity of operational risks differently using the same formal risk management instrument. Because one step in the ORM procedure is to make a decision where risks are to be weighed against -among others -mission benefits, assessments and perceptions of mission benefits have been investigated as well.
In his standard work on risk (Risk Governance), Renn (2008, 55) Gaba et al. 2003) . The assumption in this study is therefore that personnel on the work floor (operator level) will assess higher risk levels both on frequency and on severity than personnel from upper level management (headquarter level). Regarding the assessment of benefits, it is clear that the nature of day-to-day activities differs across hierarchical levels within organizations. While activities at the headquarter levels will be more coordinating and political in nature, activities at the operator level will primarily be focused on establishing the final product. Therefore, in this study, it is assumed that personnel on the work floor will consider tangible benefits more important than benefits that are of more political nature.
Method
Research was conducted in the Dutch Air Force (RNLAF). Employees from the work floor and employees from the headquarter level were asked to perform a realistic risk analysis of a fictional military aviation mission abroad. A between groups analysis design was used to compare their output (Siegel and Castellan 1988) . The RNLAF, at the time of this study, had five different main branches: fighter and training aircraft, helicopters, air transport, ground-to-air weapons and C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). This study was conducted in the (transport) helicopter branch as far as the operator level is concerned. At this level, employees conduct tasks that are more or less branch-specific. At the headquarter level, the other hierarchical level in this study, respondents were chosen from all branches. After all, task specification at this level is somewhat more diffuse than on the operator level.
The case
A fictional mission scenario was written for this study. Expert knowledge, such as experienced scenario writers from the intelligence section and operational experts, was used to help design this fictional mission. The mission scenario described a multinational peace enforcement operation on the border of two fictional countries with six RNLAF transport helicopters after a shift in the Dutch political landscape.
Two different types of RNLAF helicopters were included in the mission scenario, indicating a severe strain on the available equipment. Tasks to conduct by the RNLAF helicopters included the deliverance of logistic support to ground troops, food relief, evacuation, insertion and extraction of special forces and general support. Ground troops to be supported included Dutch Special Forces, as well as infantry troops from countries other than NATO. Standard procedures thus could not be relied on. Above all, these troops were unfamiliar with helicopter operations in general. Although this is a situation that is familiar to RNLAF helicopter crews, especially in the past, it does complicate things.
Circumstances were described in such a way that a lot of stress was put on the helicopter crews. Attack helicopters for offensive support were not available. The climate was described as tropical, implicating known and unknown tropical diseases to calculate with. The terrain was depicted mainly mountainous, combined with desert, putting constraints on load capacity and power available on the one hand and severe difficulties with landings in sandy and dusty environments on the other. Some of the parties were described as offensive. Sabotage, subversive activities and terrorist attack were all defined as realistic events. Ground-to-air threats were described as present in the area, although consisting of heavier equipment in low volumes only. Air-to-air threats could be regarded as absent according to the mission scenario. In order to support local air traffic control services, a Dutch controller was added to the detachment.
All in all, the mission scenario was set up in such a way that many risks were included. However, one of the main targets of the scenario writers was to keep the mission scenario as realistic as possible. Risks as described above are not abnormal for today's complexity of missions abroad.
Procedure
Respondents were asked to perform a risk analysis on the fictional case described above. To be able to compare the results, respondents were all led through a risk management procedure based on the RNLAF standard procedure for ORM. Since 2004, this procedure has functioned as the RNLAF standard for managing operational risks in the RNLAF (2004). The procedure has been widely known throughout the RNLAF, both at the operator level as well as at the headquarter level. One of the fundamental ideas behind this procedure, according to the RNLAF ORM handbook (2004), is that a better insight into how the organization manages risks may take away feelings of unfairness among its risk bearers.
The RNLAF ORM procedure prescribes six steps that have to be applied chronologically. The first step is to identify risk scenarios on the basis of the available information on the mission. The second step is to assess the risk value for each of these identified scenarios. The final four steps that are prescribed by the RNLAF ORM procedure are to identify, to weigh, to implement and to review relevant counter measurements, so as to avoid or to contain the identified risks. For reasons of standardizing the research set-up, the first step of the RNLAF ORM procedure -the identification of risk scenarios and mission benefits -was performed by the researchers. Since the researchers' focus was on the risk analysis part of ORM, the final four steps of the procedure -identifying, weighing, implementing and evaluating possible counter measurements -were left out of consideration.
In our study, the respondents were to apply an analysis on 25 risk scenarios as defined by the researchers. Following the RNLAF ORM procedure, respondents were asked to assess risk severity of scenarios on a scale ranging from one to four (negligible to catastrophic) and risk frequency of scenarios on a scale that ranged from one to eight (unlikely to very frequent). Risks however form only one side of the coin; the other side contains benefits. In this context, 10 benefits were also identified by the researchers. Respondents were asked to rank these on a scale from one to 10. The benefit they assessed least valuable was ranked one, while the benefit they assessed as most valuable was ranked 10. Double rankings were not permitted.
For the purpose of generating maximal participation in the research, commanders of the RNLAF were informed about the backgrounds of the study and the expected workload for respondents participating. Together with the questionnaire, respondents received an accompanying letter in which the background of the research was explained. In total, 186 questionnaires were distributed from which 75 were filled out correctly and returned (40%). From the headquarter level, 20 questionnaires were returned (44%), from the operator level 55 (38%). This level of response has to be weighed against the substantial efforts that the RNLAF had to bring out in missions abroad at the time of this study. Also, it should be taken in mind that reading the scenario and filling in the questionnaire took most of the participants about one to one and a half hour, some even more.
Data analysis
Since the results of the ranking task in the questionnaire concerned ordinal data only, nonparametric tests were used in the analysis. Another reason for the use of non-parametric tests was that the sample group from the operator level was more than 1.5 times larger than the sample group from the headquarter level. When this is the case, the parametric t-test can only be conducted under severe restrictions (Heus, Van der Leeden, and Gazendam 2003) . Especially with small samples, the power-efficiency of these non-parametric tests is often equal to and sometimes even greater than that of parametric tests, especially with small samples (Siegel and Castellan 1988) .
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The RNLAF ORM procedure that was used during the research, prescribes to assess risk levels as a combination of two separate constructs: risk severity and risk frequency. To check whether these two concepts were indeed evaluated as separate constructs by the respondents, bivariate correlations between risk severity and risk frequency were analysed. Since the literature does not provide further guidance here, an arbitrary level of two-thirds was chosen by the researchers. With this it is meant that when results on correlation between risk severity and risk frequency are not significant (p ≤ 0.05) with two-thirds or more of the respondents, the concepts of risk severity and risk frequency have been evaluated by the respondents as separate constructs. Besides this check on correlation between constructs, checks for outliers were conducted. Also, the research groups were checked whether they agreed within groups on their scores. For this check Kendall's coefficient of concordance (Kendall's W) (p ≤ 0.05) was used.
For group comparison between the headquarters and the operators on risk severity, risk frequency, and mission benefits, the two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was used (p ≤ 0.05).
With the principal component analysis (PCA) (Varimax rotation) further analysis was conducted on risk severity and risk frequency. Prior to this PCA, the suitability for factor analysis was assessed by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) index (≥ 0.6) and Bartlett's test of sphericity (p ≤ 0.05). Cattell's scree test was used in order to determine the number of factors. Further analysis on the assessment of mission benefits was done by transforming the rankings of the mission benefits into scales using Torgerson's Law of Categorical Judgement. The results of this were visualized in two graphs, one for each hierarchical level. The rankings are presented on a scale from least to most valuable.
Results
The RNLAF ORM procedure that was used during the research, prescribes that risk levels should be assessed as a combination of the two separate constructs risk severity and risk frequency. Results on bivariate correlations at the individual (case) level indicate that risk severity and risk frequency indeed have been evaluated as independent constructs by the respondents in 56 of the 75 cases (74.7%) (p ≤ 0.05). 74.7% is well above the chosen cut-off level of two-thirds. 3 Checks for outliers and Kendall's coefficient of concordance (Kendall's W) reveal no peculiarities. Results on Kendall's W are all significantly high, indicating thereby that inter-group homogeneity in both groups that had been created for this study -the headquarter level and the operator level -is present for scores on risk severity, scores on risk frequency, as well as for scores on mission benefits. In other words, the respondents in the two separate groups each applied roughly the same standard to their responses as the other members of their group, as indicated by a sufficient degree of association among their scores.
Risk severity, frequency and benefits

Risk severity and frequency
The scores on risk severity and risk frequency are shown in Table 1 . Table 1 indicates that the scores for risk severity barely differ across the two hierarchical levels. The scores for risk frequency on the other hand are consistently slightly higher at the operator level than at the headquarter level (some of these differences are significant). Table 2 shows the results on mission benefits for the two hierarchical levels.
Mission benefits
As Table 2 clearly shows, none of the differences between the hierarchical levels is significant. This means that there are hardly any noticeable differences between the two organizational levels when it comes to their assessment of the mission benefits.
Going below the surface: zooming in
The most important conclusion so far is that neither the analysis for risk severity and risk frequency, nor the analyses for mission benefits, suggests evidence for perceptual differences between the hierarchical levels with regard to mission risks and benefits. However, some perceptual differences could be present below the surface. This line of reasoning follows from research that was conducted in the steel plant industry by Prussia, Brown, and Willis (2003) . . In order to check our supposition, the data were examined more closely.
Examining risk severity and risk frequency more closely was done by means of a PCA. In Table 3 , the scheme of the PCA is represented. The KMO index and Bartlett's test of sphericity indicate that only the PCA of risk frequency at the operator level is statistically reliable (X 2 = 551.00,200, DF = 300, p = 0.000). Despite this, all results are shown in Table 4 , so as to be able to provide an indication of the characteristics of the underlying processes that help workers and managers to evaluate risk severity and risk frequency. 
Risk severity
When examining risk severity more closely, Table 4 clearly shows that both at the operator level and the headquarter level, the assessment of risk severity is grounded in similar components, suggesting no underlying perceptual differences between the two hierarchical levels at a first glance. At both hierarchical levels, 'Direct physical threats' is considered the most prominent component followed by 'Indirect threats'. However, the explained variance of the two components varies substantially Tables 5 and 6 ).
When comparing the high-loading items on the component 'Direct physical threats' between the hierarchical levels, differences can be discerned. At headquarter level, the high-loading items seem to refer to threats that are outside the direct control of members at the headquarter level. Examples of such threats are risk scenarios that follow from procedures that are set aside by workers in the field or are badly understood (R24 , Table 5 ), as well as risk scenarios that follow from the utilization of equipment that is rarely used during peace time (R23, Table 5 ). In contrast, at operator level, the component 'Direct physical threats' mainly seems to refer to threats that are considered to be outside the aircrew's controllability. High-loading risk scenarios here include scenarios on mine fields, enemy threat and terrain (R11, R12, R14, R5, R15, Table 6 ). Table 4 . Results on factor analysis risk severity and risk frequency at headquarter and operator level.
With regard to the second component of risk severity, 'Indirect threats', a similar difference reveals. At headquarter level the component 'Indirect threats' seems to refer to higher order organizational threats that are overall difficult to control. High-loading risk scenarios here include those that refer to the motivation of personnel, a reduced training capacity back home and a reduced operational capacity in the theatre due to logistic challenges (R21, R20, R19, Table 5 ). At operator level on the other hand, the component 'Indirect threats' not only includes these threats, but also those threats that directly and indirectly can hamper the workers' mission accomplishment in the field. The exemplary high-loading risk scenarios here refer to unfamiliarity with procedures (R24, Table 6 ), along with those containing threats related to equipment and weather (R23, R8, Table 6 ).
Risk frequency
Results in Table 4 indicate that with the analysis of the assessments of risk frequency, a step-down towards the item-level needs not to be made for differences between the hierarchical levels to reveal. Table 4 shows no commonalities in components for the respondents' evaluations of risk frequency. These findings correspond with the result that scores for risk frequency differed more across the two hierarchical levels than those for risk severity.
At headquarter level, 'Unfamiliarity or uncertainty outside organizational control' seems to be the first component on which the assessment of risk frequency is grounded. Risk scenarios that are high-loading here are those that include threats such as unclear procedures, unfamiliar equipment and circumstantial uncertainties (R24, R23, R13, R6, R8). This component refers to 26% of the explained variance. The second component at headquarter level is considered to be 'Complexity of organizational challenges', accounting for 17% of the explained variance (high-loading risk scenarios: R20, R21, R19). At operator level, the first component is '(Perceived) exposure' of the crews towards risks in general (R19, R22, R15). The second component at this level has been titled 'Hidden or startling threats', a factor that addresses the (in)visibility or the (im)possibility to observe threats in the theatre (R13, R14, R8, R2). These two dimensions account for 28 and 20% of the explained variance, respectively. Table 5 . PCA risk severity at headquarter level. 
Mission Benefits
Examining mission benefits more closely was done by means of the application of Torgerson's Law of Categorical Judgement. Figure 1 contains the resulting graphs. From the graphs in Figure 1 it can be concluded that, although not significant as results in Table 2 have pointed out, members of the headquarter level perceive 'Presence of Dutch helicopters in international theatre' (Item B7) as much more valuable than members of the operator level. Another conclusion that follows from the results as presented in Figure 1 concerns the two most valuable mission benefits. Where 'Contributing to international peace and security' (Item B10) is perceived as most valuable at the operator level, followed by 'Helping local population' (Item B9), these same two items are perceived as most valuable at headquarter level, yet in the opposite order. In this discussion, some advantages and disadvantages of how the study was executed will be discussed. Also we will give some theoretical reflections. However, we first start with highlighting some of the most interesting outcomes.
Discussion
The outcomes
In this paper, two hierarchical levels were studied for differences in perceptions on risk frequency, risk severity and mission benefits as obtained from a risk analysis conducted in accordance with RNLAF procedures. It was expected that significant differences between different hierarchical levels in the RNLAF would be found in the assessments of all three categories. In contrast to our assumptions, however, almost no significant differences were found. The ones that were found though, (on risk frequency) appeared to be in line with former research, suggesting that upper level management estimates less risk than work floor employees (e.g. Gaba et al. 2003) . A somewhat closer examination of the data did suggest perceptual differences.
Especially with regard to risk severity and risk frequency, we found indications for perceptual differences in a recurrent pattern of 'local rationality' (Woods et al. 1994) . This was most apparent in the analysis of risk frequency. Nevertheless, also in the assessment of risk severity the two organizational levels seemed to rationalize risks from their own hierarchical perspectives. 'Controllability' seemed to be the keyword here; what was included or excluded in the perception of risks seemed to epend on the own controllability of the risks mentioned. The PCAs differed between the hierarchical levels in such a way that many of the high-loading items referred to those threats that can be considered outside the direct control of members of the respective hierarchical levels making the assessment. These results confirm a notion that was brought up by Dekker (2005, 78) : 'Human actions and assessments can be described meaningfully only in reference to the localized setting in which they [were produced]'. This study also mirrors another conclusion of Dekker (2006, 185) : the local rationality principle does not only apply to the operational level, but to managers as well. More research is however needed in order to find out if local rationality in risk management can be recognized with more analytical depth. After all, only after several levels of analysis we distinguished these underlying (sources for) hierarchical differences in risk assessments.
Some methodological reflections
The study described in this paper has been conducted within the RNLAF. This could imply that results cannot unconditionally be generalized to other organizations. Research constraints furthermore allowed the evaluation of one mission only, implicating that results should be regarded as exploratory in nature. However, results provide us with new insights and, above all, offer a few interesting themes for discussion and further research.
When conducting research in the own organization, there is always the imminent risk of bias. On the other hand, conducting the research from 'within' and taking an emic perspective has some benefits as well. One of these benefits in this case was that, because of our own experience within the organization, we were able to construct a realistic and attractive scenario. Having a realistic scenario heightened response substantially as many respondents stated afterwards. This can be seen as a significant achievement since participating in this study was rather time-consuming for the respondents. We have further chosen to compose the research in such a way that organizational procedures were followed closely. One reason for this was to study risk assessment in its most natural form, i.e. as it is conducted in realistic military aviation settings. Another reason was that this enabled us to provide useful feedback to the organization studied here on their risk management tool, which increased organizational support for the study even more.
Some theoretical reflections
It would be too naïve to say that the apparent commonality of assessments of risks and benefits followed inherently from using the same instrument since other accounts can have similar or even better explanatory power. For example, this commonality could as well have been the result of having expert participants only. After all, much of the risk perception literature, such as Renn's seminal paper on risk perception in 1987 and Beck's Risk Society in 1992, focus on the sheer difference in risk perception between lay and expert people. While experts are considered to be rational and to rely on real, objectively analysed and calculated risks, lay people, according to this literature, have a subjective, even emotional view on risk that they think is of equal importance although of sheer different nature.
Expert models of risk, as we have stated in the theoretical framework, are however not incontestable as well. The RNLAF, we pointed out, uses a highly simplified bi-dimensional model of risk while the literature has long debated for multi-dimensionality in risk models (e.g. Kunreuther and Slovic 1996; Renn 1998; Slovic 1999; 2001) . Maybe more differences could have been distinguished when we would not have persisted in using the RNLAF ORM procedure, with its ample two dimensions of risk frequency and risk severity (weighed against a third dimension: the mission benefits). Maybe other and more differences could have been distinguished when we would have used a more enriched, multi-dimensional model of risk. On the other hand, we would then still be wondering perhaps about how these differences would work through in actual organizational risk management processes with their more simplified risk models.
What this study brings to the risk literature is maybe exactly that: it connects risk theory with organizational risk management practice. One way to interpret the results is that in this particular organization the culture is such that, contrary to our hypothesis, its members across hierarchy have an unexpected coherence in their values when it comes to the perception of risk. Such an interpretation however counters former research that predicts hierarchical differences in risk perception (Arboleda et al. 2003; Gaba et al. 2003; Mearns and Flin 1995; Prussia, Brown, and Willis 2003) . Another interpretation, supported by a more thorough examination of the data, is that risk management tools can well obscure hierarchical perceptual differences concerning the very nature of risk within organizations. Perceptual differences may not get mirrored in the outcomes of formal risk management tools. The establishment and use of safety management tools may therefore not be enough to achieve safe operations. One even can get to doubt, as Nyce, Bakx, and Dekker (2010) expressed as well, whether 'these tools are used in an attempt to improve decision-making, or if these merely are utilized to justify (political) decisions already made'. Notes 1. Interpretative framing: the mental mechanisms in social interaction that help participants define how others' actions and words should be understood, make sense of a situation they find themselves in, to find and interpret specifics that, to them, seem central to understanding the
